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 “WE DIDN’T CROSS THE BORDER; THE BORDER 
CROSSED US”: INFORMAL SOCIAL 
ADAPTATIONS TO FORMAL GOVERNANCE AND 
POLICIES BY COMMUNITIES ACROSS THE 
BERING SEA REGION IN THE RUSSIAN FAR 
EAST AND UNITED STATES.1 
Sarah Roop*, Lilian Alessa*, Andrew Kliskey*, Maryann Fidel** 
& Grace Beaujean** 
ABSTRACT: Territorially isolated villages along the shores of the U.S. and 
Russian Bering Sea live with stark political lines dividing a region that shares a 
common history, heritage, and contemporary existence. It is also a region whose 
environmental security is threatened by common changes occurring throughout 
the area but for whom possible responses to these changes are shaped by the 
policies and politics of the countries in which they reside. This paper is based on 
the experience from an international observing network, the Community 
Observing Network for Adaptation and Security (CONAS), which provides rare 
insights on how political context, across the remote and unique region of the 
Bering Sea, shapes the realities of a People and how informal social institutions 
have adapted as a result. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A region culminating in the landless North Pole; a part of 
eight nation-states, yet apart from those nation-states; the 
Arctic region is a complex, variably defined area that has, until 
recently, been largely ignored by much of the world. The 
Arctic’s indigenous peoples have adapted to its harsh 
environment over thousands of years, but only within the last 
few centuries has the indigenous population been forced to 
include the adoption of policies, politics, and cultures of 
nations claiming sovereignty over northern Arctic lands. The 
effect of these imposed borders has been different for the 
distinct Arctic societies, with varying degrees of imposed 
regulation based upon national perception and politics. 
Although past politics are inseparable from the current 
situation of remote populations in the Arctic, the focus of this 
paper is to explore the role of the present borders and how they 
affect remote populations, as well as analyze the effectiveness 
of current international cooperation, governance options, and 
community-based organizations arising from informal social 
institutions in providing sustainable and secure livelihoods for 
remote communities. We will focus upon the remote peoples of 
the Bering Sea, which will be explored largely through the 
policies of two nations, the United States and the Russian 
Federation, and the work of the Community Observing 
Network for Adaptation and Security (CONAS), an 
international community-based observation network in the 
Bering Sea. By examining the effects of recent politics, the past 
and present realities faced by Arctic peoples will emerge along 
with various forms of cooperation and governance in support of 
adaptive capacity in this interdependent, fragile environment. 
Ultimately the goal is to present an encompassing view of the 
political influence of Arctic peoples within their respective 
national context; to show a common determination to adapt to 
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a changing way of life; and to demonstrate the exclusiveness of 
an international community at times more receptive to help in 
that adaptation, and at times more focused than ever on 
exploiting the riches from an area becoming ever more 
accessible. 
A.  The Arctic and its People 
To discuss the Arctic, it is first necessary to define its 
boundaries. While the Arctic is rationally defined by the Arctic 
Circle, the useable definition of the Arctic is more arbitrary. 
Because of this paper’s humanistic approach, the general area 
determined within the AMAP definition will serve as the 
boundaries of the Arctic.2 
Of the approximately four million people who reside in the 
Arctic, about 400,000 are considered indigenous,3 a number 
which fluctuates, as do many other indicators in the Arctic, 
according to the defined boundary of the region.4 Ultimately, 
the Arctic region is comprised mostly of non-indigenous 
people.5 For the purpose of this paper, when speaking of Arctic 
indigenous peoples, it will be inclusive only of the population of 
people who existed in the Arctic before those from more 
Western traditions came. It is defined by those who share a 
language, history, and culture that is different from the 
dominant society. It is a group of people who have existed in 
the Arctic outside of modern political and legal systems and 
were enveloped within those systems without choice. When 
addressing remote communities, this will be inclusive of both 
indigenous peoples and those non-indigenous to the region 
whom have made these communities their home and are 
subject to the same climatic challenges. 
Indigenous populations in the Arctic are not a single group. 
They are diverse groups of small populations representing 
hundreds of different social traditions with as many distinct 
languages, unique histories, and cultural practices that have 
2. ARCTIC MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, AMAP ASSESSMENT 2002: 
HUMAN HEALTH IN THE ARCTIC 2–3 (2003). 
3. JOHN MCCANNON, A HISTORY OF THE ARCTIC 292 (2012). 
4. ROBBIE ANDREW, AMAP, SOCIO-ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC 1, 
20 (2014), http://folk.uio.no/roberan/docs/Andrew,%202014%20-%20tr9_aaca_scenarios 
_2014.pdf. 
5. Id. 
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developed over time and, in the past century and a half, 
responded to the Western culture with which each group of 
people has come in contact.6 What unites these peoples with 
those non-indigenous to the region, is the relatively extreme 
environment in which they live, a region largely ignored by 
governing powers until its land and sea proved to be profitable. 
Sovereignty was then assumed by modern nation-states, and 
eventually, all indigenous populations of the Arctic were 
affected in substantial ways which differed according to which 
country’s border had subsumed them. 
As borders were drawn across the Arctic, the residing 
populations suddenly found themselves to be in unknown 
territory. For some indigenous populations—notably the Sami 
now of Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia, whose 
livelihoods revolved around reindeer husbandry—fixed borders 
in some areas meant the loss of their way of life.7 For other 
indigenous peoples, such as the Inuit of Greenland, being a 
territory of Denmark and defined within its sovereignty meant 
little regarding the physical border but would shape 
indigenous societies through the policies imposed upon them.8 
Whether Aleut and Siberian Yupik in Alaska and Russia; 
Athabaskan and Inuit of Alaska and Canada; Sami of 
Eurasia—they all share resources that are tied to food security 
and culture. 
B.  The Bering Sea and its People 
The Bering Sea is home to a multitude of indigenous peoples 
including: the Eastern Unangan Aleut; Western/Aktan 
Unangas Aleut; Central Yup’ik; Siberian/St. Lawrence Island 
Yupik; Inupiaq; Koryak; and Chukchi. Currently it is 
estimated that there are around 100,000 living in Bering Sea 
coastal communities.9 Though peoples of the Bering Sea all 
6. Jonathan D. Greenberg, The Arctic in World Environmental History, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1307, 132526 (2009). 
7. See Patrik Lantto, Borders, Citizenship and Change: The Case of the Sami People, 
1751–2008, 14 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 543 (2010). 
8. See Ulrik P. Gad, Greenland: A Post-Danish Sovereign Nation State in the 
Making, COOPERATION & CONFLICT 98 (2013). 
9. Maryann Fidel et al., Subsistence Density Mapping Brings Practical Values to 
Decision Making, in FISHING PEOPLE OF THE NORTH: CULTURES, ECONOMICS, AND 
MANAGEMENT RESPONDING TO CHANGE 193 (Courtney Carothers et al. eds., 2012). 
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have unique cultural traditions, histories, and languages, they 
are connected through the shared resources provided by the 
sea that are becoming more and more threatened by global and 
environmental change10 and increasingly, industrial 
development.11 
Despite current fixed locations of these peoples, movement 
across the North Pacific, Bering, Chukchi, and Beaufort Seas 
was common historically. During the Cold War, this fluid 
transfer of people was legally restricted due to the 
implantation of the “Ice Curtain.”12 This made it such that 
indigenous peoples from the same ethnic and cultural 
background permanently residing on either side of the Bering 
Sea were separated not just by the waves, but by fixed 
international boundaries. This primarily affected the Eastern 
and Western/Aktan Aleut, or Unangas and Unangan, as well 
as the Siberian Yupik on St. Lawrence Island and the 
Chukotka Peninsula.13 Imposing borders on peoples of shared 
cultural and ethnic heritage not only functioned as a barrier 
between families and extended kinship networks, but it also 
limited the exchange of knowledge, communication, and 
observations, mechanisms which are critical to the emergence 
and sustenance of informal social institutions.14 
C.  Informal Social Institutions 
Informal social institutions can refer to traditional culture, 
personal networks, corruption, clan organizations, civil society, 
and a wide variety of behavioral norms, such as perceptions, 
values, and beliefs. While formal institutions refer to state 
bodies (courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and state enforced 
rules (constitutions, laws, regulations), informal institutions 
10. Jacqueline M. Grebmeier et al., A Major Ecosystem Shift in the Northern Bering 
Sea, 311 SCI. 1461 (2013). 
11. P. Holthus, C. Clarkin, and J. Lorentzen, Emerging Arctic Opportunities: 
Dramatic Increases Expected in Arctic Shipping, Oil and Gas Exploration, Fisheries 
and Tourism, 70:2 COAST GUARD J. SAFETY & SECURITY SEA 10, 12 (2013).  
12. A. Hills, Melting the Ice Curtain between Russia and Alaska, BUS. COMM. REV., 
Dec. 1993, at 26. 
13. RACHEL ROSE STARKS, JEN MCCORMACK & STEPHEN CORNELL, NATIVE NATIONS 
AND U.S. BORDERS: CHALLENGES TO INDIGENOUS CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
SECURITY 73 (2013). 
14. Id. at 73–77. 
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encompass civic, religious, and other societal organizations.15 
Informal institutions tend to have socially shared rules that 
are understood by all within a culture.16 We propose that they 
are a critical adaptive practice in the Arctic, which is 
experiencing rapid social and environmental changes. For 
example, common-pool resource problems have been solved by 
voluntary organizations, which often arise from informal social 
institutions.17 A common pool resource is defined as a “natural 
or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to 
make it costly to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining 
benefits from its use.”17 The large marine resource of the 
Bering Sea can be defined as a common-pool resource. 
An important mechanism that is integral in maintaining 
natural systems in the Arctic and the Bering Sea is traditional 
local knowledge (TLK) or “sustained intimacy with the land, 
its flora, and its animal creatures derived from extraordinarily 
close attention to the physical world, exquisitely fine-tuned 
perception, and intuitive decision-making based on the lived 
awareness of hugely complex empirical data and constantly 
evolving and changing connections, webs and relationships.”18 
TLK often guides the emergence of informal institutions which 
are adaptive and important not only for the survival of the 
cultures of the indigenous peoples, but are also the foundation 
for natural resource sustainability. TLK helped to preserve 
small populations of subsistence based societies for thousands 
of years, conserve plant and animal life, and maintain 
communal traditions.19 
In the last fifty years, the remote communities of the Arctic 
have been presented with an unprecedented challenge: a series 
of dramatic climatic changes with consequences that affect the 
delicate balance of human and nature in the Arctic 
15. Gretchen Helmke & Steven Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Comparative 
Politics: A Research Agenda, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 725 (2004). 
16. Helmke and Levitsky go on to describe socially shared rules as rules that are 
created, accepted, and enforced outside of official channels, and are often unwritten. 
As formal institutions are openly codified, this distinction helps to differentiate 
between formal and informal institutions. 
17. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 30 (1990). 
18. Greenberg, supra note 6, at 1330. 
19. Id. at 1329. 
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environment. 20 Changing temperatures bring with it a host of 
challenges including rising sea levels, increased ultraviolet 
radiation, decreasing sea ice, and melting permafrost. 
However, some changes, such as decreasing sea ice, also imply 
opportunities for new shipping routes and economic 
development.21 Changing climate in the Arctic also brings 
about stresses that threaten the adaptive capacity of some 
Arctic populations and their ecosystems, such as air and water 
contamination, overfishing, habitat alteration, increased 
pollutants from exploitative activities, and growing population 
demands on the region.22 Remote communities continue to link 
TLK with scientific observations, allowing room for multiple 
perspectives on the changes taking place that may lead to 
more diverse adaptation strategies. Even at times when the 
two sources for observations are not completely congruent, 
meaningful insights may be drawn from discrepancies.23 
Overall, by incorporating different informal institutions into 
both basic and applied scientific inquiry, a more complete 
picture can be obtained. 
II.  FORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
A.  Arctic Borders 
Borders are coming to mean even more in the Arctic region. 
Prior to the turn of the century, the Arctic land had been a 
stage for resource extraction, national sovereignty rights, and 
military preparedness; the Arctic Sea was a scene for further 
militarization. Now, however, the diminishing ice cap is 
redefining the boundary of the Arctic in terms of shipping, oil, 
and mining,24 particularly when combined with ever-improving 
technology to extract resources. In response to disputes over 
national borders within the Arctic, the United Nations 
20. SUSAN JOY HASSOL, ACIA, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT 8 (2004), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu. 
21. CHARLES EMMERSON, THE FUTURE HISTORY OF THE ARCTIC 274–81 (2010). 
22. HASSOL, supra note 20, at 11. 
23. HENRY HUNTINGTON & SHARI FOX, ACIA, THE CHANGING ARCTIC: INDIGENOUS 
PERSPECTIVES 6466 (2004), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/ACIA_Science_ 
Chapters_Final/ACIA_Ch03_Final.pdf. 
24. Jeppe Strandsbjerg, Cartopolitics, Geopolitics and Boundaries in the Arctic, 17 
GEOPOLITICS 818, 819 (2012).  
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Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was signed in 
1982 and came into force in 1994,25 allowing countries upon 
ratification to extend their sovereign rights into maritime 
areas following two main principles: the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) and the Continental Shelf.26 The EEZ related 
largely to fishing zones and allowed nations rights to all living 
and non-living resources as far as 200 nautical miles from a 
country’s juridical coastline.27 The Continental Shelf refers to 
the extension of a nation’s landmass into the sea and relates 
directly to that nation’s sovereign rights to exploit the natural 
resources found there.28 All Arctic nations as well as 152 other 
countries, with the exception of the United States, are parties 
to UNCLOS.29 
Amongst the Arctic nations, most have prepared to increase 
their presence in the region. Norway stated in 2005 that the 
Arctic was a priority as a main strategic interest, and Canada 
repeated claims to their Arctic presence.30 The Russian 
Federation has claimed extraction of Arctic oil as the 
cornerstone in remaining an energy superpower.31 While the 
United States remains divided on further Arctic exploitation, 
with politicians at odds over environmental concerns versus 
energy independence,32 one need not look further than the U.S. 
Geological Survey’s Arctic petroleum assessment to see the 
intent of future oil extraction.33 Increasing tensions are 
emerging as countries with the majority of arctic coastline, 
Canada, Russia, and Norway, assert their rights to implement 
potentially conflicting visions. Additional players such as 
China, France, and Japan only add to uncertainties about 
what arctic policies may be implemented in the future. 
Presently, the reach of nation-states—their influence, 
borders, and the actions they take regarding the Arctic 
region—affect remote Arctic regions, as well as indigenous and 
25. EMMERSON, supra note 21, at 83. 
26. Strandsbjerg, supra note 24, at 829. 
27. Id. at 830. 
28. Id. at 831. 
29. Id. at 83. 
30. Strandsbjerg, supra note 24, at 820–21. 
31. EMMERSON, supra note 21, at 208. 
32. Id. at 171–72. 
33. ANDREW, supra note 4, at 14. 
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non-indigenous peoples alike. The following discussion will 
develop the recent historical context within the Russian 
Federation (formerly the USSR) and the United States 
regarding the relationship between indigenous societies and 
nation-states. Approaching present day, the discussion will 
come to include the entire population of remote communities, 
the environmental challenges they face, and ultimately, the 
informal governance arising from informal social institutions 
that are developing out of necessity to allow these communities 
to take part in policies, national and international, affecting 
their adaptation to a changing environment. 
Historically, the impact of nation-states taking interest and 
enforcing borders in the Arctic influenced the entire structure 
of remote indigenous societies. One defining example amongst 
indigenous, Arctic populations that differentiates them from 
non-indigenous is that they considered themselves sovereign 
peoples.34 Unlike the modern state, the borders of the 
territories for which they claimed sovereignty were not defined 
lines, but instead a fluctuating boundary necessitated because 
of the more nomadic lifestyle demanded by the environment. 
Hunters and gatherers, fishermen, and herders—indigenous 
peoples throughout the Arctic—balanced a lifestyle according 
to the ebb and flow of natural forces and found themselves ill-
equipped when it came to knowing and respecting political 
borders. 
B.  The Alaska-Russia Border 
1.  Historic Institutions on Each Side of the Border 
The United States acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867, 
simultaneously acquiring a dispersed population of about 
60,000 indigenous peoples, at a time when the United States 
Congress was ending its treaty making policies with Native 
Americans and beginning an era of assimilation policies.35 
Alaska remained a military district until the Organic Act in 
1884, which established the precedent for native claims to 
land, and also treated Alaska Natives as United States citizens 
34. Greenberg, supra note 6, at 1328. 
35. Samuel Gottstein, An Era Of Continued Neglect: Assessing the Impact of 
Congressional Exemptions for Alaska Natives, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1261, 1262 (2014). 
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without separate sovereignty.36 
In contrast, Russia had a much more developed relationship 
with its indigenous peoples by the turn of the twentieth 
century. Tsarist Russia was well acquainted with the 
indigenous population of the North, identifying them as the 
Small Peoples of the North and encouraging Russian 
settlement upon entering into the Industrial Revolution. 37 As 
was the basis for Imperial Russian rule, customary law was 
imposed upon indigenous communities to uphold judicial 
norms, but this system of indirect rule allowed indigenous 
communities to administer their affairs with minimal 
interference from authorities.38 While some communities were 
hit hard by taxation and resource exploitation, such as the 
Kamchatka region and the Far East, other indigenous 
communities, notably the Chukchi, were able to remain 
relatively autonomous and to diminish the impact of the 
colonizing culture, economy, and religion being imposed upon 
neighboring Arctic areas.39 
Following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, all regions of the 
U.S.S.R. felt the effects of “Sovietization” as the Kremlin 
sought out even the most remote communities to incorporate 
into the national cause40 and established rule over indigenous 
populations.41 By the late 1920s, all Arctic communities had 
been brought under the umbrella of socialist collectivization 
policies, meaning that all property was confiscated and became 
the property of the State. More specifically, the State 
expropriated and transferred the reindeer of Arctic 
communities dependent upon them into larger herds, known as 
Collective Farms, and drafted native shepherds into “reindeer 
brigades.” Furthermore, the State quashed religious beliefs 
36. Martha Hirschfield, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal 
Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 Yale L.J. 1334, 1335 (1998). 
37. MCCANNON, supra note 3, at 149, 151.   
38. JOHANNES ROHR, IWGIA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: 
IWGIA REPORT 18, 17 (Diana Vinding & Kathrin Wessendorf eds., 2014).  
39. See, e.g., Andrei A. Znamenski, “Vague Sense of Belonging to the Russian 
Empire”: The Reindeer Chukchi’s Status in Nineteenth Century Northeastern Siberia, 
36 ARCTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 19 (1999).  
40. Greenberg, supra note 6, at 1358. 
41. Andrei V. Golovnev, Indigenous Leadership in Northwestern Siberia: Traditional 
Patterns and Their Contemporary Manifestations, 34 ARCTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 149, 156 
(1997). 
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and required children to attend boarding schools far from their 
homelands.42 This meant the combining of multiple 
nationalities and the loss of traditional and social structures as 
indigenous peoples were organized into Soviet collectives. 
During the 1930s, the U.S.S.R. was organized into okrugs 
(regions), which would eventually lead to the complete 
dissolution of indigenous self-governance.43 
Three major legislative acts would come to shape today’s 
indigenous populations in Alaska: The Alaska Statehood Act, 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA), and The 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA).44 
The Alaska Statehood Act of 1958 allowed the state to choose 
approximately 104 acres of land not yet claimed as federal 
land.45 In 1971, ANSCA was passed, providing a one-time cash 
settlement of nearly one billion dollars to some 78,000 Alaska 
natives, along with forty-four million acres of public land.46 
The settlement and fee simple titles to the land were 
distributed through twelve newly created regional Native 
corporations and approximately 200 village corporations.47 
ANSCA extinguished aboriginal title to native lands and also 
dispossessed Alaska Natives of 320 million acres of traditional 
lands, including land on the North Slope.48 The last Act, 
ANILCA, was passed in 1980 and developed in response to the 
unaddressed issue of subsistence rights. It gave people living 
in rural places in Alaska priority to hunt and fish on public 
lands.49 It does not address Alaska Natives specifically and 
excludes those who live in the few areas classified as urban, 
allowing all who may be more reliant on subsistence living to 
have subsistence rights. 
The middle decades of the twentieth century constituted an 
42. Petra Rethman, Deadly Dis-Ease: Medical Knowledge and Healing in Northern 
Kamchatka, Russia, 23 CULTURE, MED. & PSYCHIATRY 197, 202 (1999). 
43. Golovnev, supra note 41, at 156. 
44. Wayne Edwards & Tara Natarajan, ANCSA and ANILCA: Capabilities Failure?, 
17 NATIVE STUD. REV. 69, 82–83 (2008). 
45. Id. at 82. 
46. Lisa Drew, Here’s Your Land, Now Make Money, NATIONAL WILDLIFE (WORLD 
EDITION), Dec. 91/Jan. 92, at 38, 39. 
47. Edwards & Natarajan, supra note 44, at 83. 
48. Jeffrey Aslan, Building Alaska Native Village Resilience in a Post-Peak World, 37 
VT. L. REV. 239, 243 (2012). 
49. Edwards & Natarajan, supra note 44, at 82. 
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era of limited autonomy for the indigenous peoples of the 
Arctic. Perhaps more importantly, these decades brought more 
substantial change to their ways of life than at any other time 
in history.50 Yet, despite the social, economic, and political 
transformations, traditional cultural practices exist today.51 
After the pressure to assimilate began to decrease, a revival of 
culture and identity emerged, in a form that could 
accommodate for modernity and globalization.52 Indeed, in 
every country where governments allowed for negotiations 
regarding measures of autonomy and land claims, indigenous 
peoples promptly presented coherent demands.53 
2.  International Arctic Institutions 
In 1989 Finland invited the eight Arctic states—the USSR, 
the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden, and Finland—to Rovaniemi to begin talks on 
cooperation and environmental protections in the Arctic. In 
1991, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) 
was agreed upon, establishing four working groups: the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), the 
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), the 
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), 
and the Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME). 
AEPS was superseded in 1996 by the Arctic Council.54 
The Arctic Council consists of eight member states (as 
previously listed); six Permanent Participants made up of 
indigenous peoples Arctic-wide (the Arctic Athabaskan 
Council, the Aleut International Association, the Gwich’in 
Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the 
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples, and the Saami 
Council); and a host of working groups (the aforementioned 
plus the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) and the 
50. Yvon Csonka & Peter Schweitzer, Societies and Cultures: Change and 
Persistance, in ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 45, 49 (Lassi Heininen & Chris 
Southcott eds., 2004), available at http://www.svs.is/en/10-all-languages-content/28-
ahdr-chapters-english. 
51. Greenberg, supra note 6, at 1329. 
52. Csonka & Schweitzer, supra note 50, at 52. 
53. Id. at 50. 
54. Torbjørn Pedersen, Debates over the Role of the Arctic Council, 43 OCEAN DEV. & 
INT’L L. 146, 148 (2012). 
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Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG)).55 The 
Arctic Council works to promote international cooperation and 
coordination among Arctic States in environmental protection, 
including the natural environment as well as the human 
environment, and sustainable development, including use of 
natural resources, economic development, and adaptive 
capacity of local remote communities.56 
Nations continue to provide a governmental structure to the 
Arctic largely based on mutual benefit and cooperation, and 
the Arctic Council is as strong as ever,57 displaying its ability 
to adjust to high-level issues—such as melting sea ice, 
international shipping, gas and oil exploitation, and migrating 
fish stocks—that, for many, seemed beyond its capacity.58 
The Arctic Council is by definition a “high level 
intergovernmental forum,” which operates on a different scale 
than the Arctic communities living out the realities of these 
transformations in their everyday lives—realities that often 
transcend national borders. Indeed, an Arctic community may 
have closer ties to communities in other parts of the Arctic 
beyond the national borders that contain it,59 and with similar 
environmental conditions and culturally-tied peoples, 
transnational communities within the Arctic may have more 
relevant information to share with one another than with 
other communities within its own nation. While the Arctic 
Council provides an international voice, and nations’ policies 
now generally work to provide increasing rights to these 
communities, any legal framework that applies to 
transnational peoples is not legally binding on nations.60 The 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP) comes closest to addressing such issues in 
55. See ARCTIC COUNCIL (2014–2015), http://www.arctic-Council.org/index.php/en 
(last visited May 16, 2015). 
56. Waliul Hasanat, Diverse Soft-Law Cooperation Forms in the Arctic — Do They 
Complement or Contradict Each Other?, 14 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 173, 284–85 
(2014). 
57. Pedersen, supra note 54, at 152. 
58. Timo Koivurova, The Arctic Council: A Testing Ground for New International 
Environmental Governance, 19 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 131, 137–38 (2012). 
59. Hasanat, supra note 56, at 282. 
60. Timo Koivurova, Sovereign States and Self-Determining Peoples: Carving Out a 
Place for Transnational Indigenous Peoples in a World of Sovereign States, 12 INT’L 
COMMUNITY L. REV. 191, 203 (2010). 
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Article 36, stating:61 
 
1.  Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided 
by international borders, have the right to maintain 
and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, 
including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, 
economic and social purposes, with their own 
members as well as other peoples across borders. 
2. States, in consultation and cooperation with 
indigenous peoples, shall take effective measures to 
facilitate the exercise and ensure the 
implementation of this right. 
 
But even this proves to be insufficient as such communities 
are encouraged to maintain contacts, yet UNDRIP still 
maintains a framework of the sovereign nation-state within 
which each community must function.62 The United Nations 
Nuuk Declaration goes further, recommending that nation-
states take measures to guarantee indigenous peoples’ cross-
border rights through legally binding conventions.63 Yet a 
recommendation does not compel compliance, nor does it 
facilitate coordination between nations. So the question arises, 
when the Arctic is narrowed down to specific localities, and 
those localities traverse national borders, what structures are 
in place to address the shared issues of a transnational region? 
3.  Formation of Regional Institutions 
Internally, in the USSR at the breakup of the Cold War, 
local and regional organizations that had been slowly forming 
were seen as accessible political forums for individuals from 
remote communities to approach with concerns ranging from 
indigenous rights to more localized concerns regarding their 
livelihoods and community conditions.64 Local and regional 
indigenous organizations would come to function under the 
Russian Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North 
(RAIPON), which was established by the Congress of 
61. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/66/142 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
62. Koivurova, supra note 58, at 210. 
63. Nuuk Arctic Declaration on the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples 2014, 12 
FOURTH WORLD J. 69, 74 (Winter 2014). 
64. ROHR, supra note 38, at 24. 
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Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia and 
the Far East held in 1989 and continuing thereafter every four 
years.65 This council structure made up of the regional 
organizations formed a unifying nationwide decision making 
body.66 With national advocacy and recognition, indigenous 
peoples could effectively be a part of the national and 
international scene. Beyond RAIPON, other international 
organizations were forming ties with Russian indigenous 
peoples representing overlapping missions: the Saami Council 
accepted the Russian Kola Saami Association as a member in 
1992;67 a Russian branch of the Inuit Circumpolar Council 
Conference was opened;68 and, most notably Aleut 
International Association (AIA) combined with the Aleut 
associations on the Russian side of the Aleutian Islands in 
1998.69 AIA became a permanent participant of the Arctic 
Council in 1998. 
Within the United States, Alaska Natives began to advocate 
for tribal sovereignty in the early 1980s largely to be a part of 
economic benefits from and decisions regarding extractive 
developments taking place as well as taking part in affecting 
hunting and fishing regulation.70 While opposed by the state, 
Alaska Natives were designated by the Department of the 
Interior as recognized tribes in 1993, receiving the same 
privileges, immunities, and powers as other tribes recognized 
by the Federal Government.71 Divided into regional 
corporations and tribal villages, both local and regional tribal 
governments speak for their people and also represent tribal 
interests in co-managing national resource organizations such 
as the Alaska Beluga Whale Committee, Ice Seal Committee, 
Eskimo Walrus Commission, and Alaska Nanuuq 
Commission.72 Alaska has tribal membership in four major 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 24–25. 
70. Gottstein, supra note 35, at 1265. 
71. Aslan, supra note 48, at 247. 
72. JOEL P. CLEMENT, JOHN L. BENGTSON & BRENDAN P. KELLY, INTERAGENCY 
WORKING GRP. ON COORD. OF DOM. ENERGY DEV. AND PERMITTING IN ALASKA, 
MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ARCTIC: A REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT (2013). 
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organizations in the  Arctic Council: the Arctic Athabaskan 
Council (formed in 2000 and made up of Alaskan and 
Canadian Athabaskan), the Aleut International Association 
(registered in 1998 made up of Alaskan and Russian Aleuts), 
the Gwich’in Council International (established in 1999 and 
made up of Alaskan and Canadian Gwich’in communities), and 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council (founded in 1978 and 
representing Inuit from Canada, Alaska, Russia and 
Greenland).73 
The end of the Cold War between the United States and the 
former USSR marked a time when Arctic indigenous 
organizations could finally take root in a landscape caught in a 
stalemate between the two influential nations. Prior to the end 
of the Cold War, forms of cooperation were stymied not only 
from the Arctic’s stifled position during the military build-up, 
but also from a lack of recognition of the Arctic as a region: it 
was not generally recognized as a political or geographical 
destination in the international arena constituting 
international cooperation.74 Yet, it is speculated that 
cooperation in the form of soft-law bodies is exactly the kind of 
governance the Arctic needs: its very nature lending itself 
more readily to adaptation as it involves a much wider 
spectrum of international players and forms of knowledge than 
does formal law and policy.75 
III.  INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
Formal governance is often based on government-sponsored 
data. However, these data either: a) are not trusted, b) do not 
reflect the plurality of social contexts on the ground, or c) are 
incomplete and lack social context particularly at local scales.76 
In order to develop more comprehensive and reliable ways of 
knowing, community-based observation networks (CBONs) are 
emerging as a powerful tool in enhancing local to regional 
73. See ARCTIC COUNCIL (2014–2015), http://www.arctic-Council.org/index.php/en. 
74. Lassi Heininen & Heather N. Nicol, The Importance of Northern Dimension 
Foreign Policies in the Geopolitics of the Circumpolar North, 12 GEOPOLITICS 133, 137 
(2007). 
75. Hasanat, supra note 56, at 298. 
76. Marc J. Hetherington & John D. Nugent, Explaining Public Support for 
Devolution: The Role of Political Trust, in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT 
AMERICANS DISLIKE? 134–38 (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001). 
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social adaptation. A CBON is a distributed array of human 
sensors in communities throughout a region who are able to 
observe their environments on a regular basis and, in this 
capacity, are capable of detecting events that indicate whether 
the environmental system is operating unusually.77 As 
demands on common-pool resources, such as the industrial and 
environmental pressures found in the Bering Sea, increase, 
cooperative institutions arising from informal institutions 
which are governed and organized by resource users may be 
especially effective in advancing conservation goals.78 
Successful common-pool resource governance by local actors is 
dependent upon many factors. Some of these factors include: 
conditions that allow local leaders and harvesters to self-
organize effective rules, effective communication and trust 
among users, sharing of common knowledge of the resource 
and cultural use, and users placing high value on the 
sustainability of the resource.79 Similarities are found across 
indigenous science practices (which incorporate TLK) 
throughout the Bering Sea regarding cultural resource use 
patterns, and the value attached to maintaining indigenous 
ways of life that revolve around the health of the Bering Sea is 
extremely high. The United States-Russian border has 
disrupted effective communication and trust but informal 
institutions are developing that facilitate positive interaction, 
re-building camaraderie, discourse, and sharing “lessons 
learned”. 
A.  Community-based Observation Networks arising from 
Informal Social Institutions 
In the past, nations have built policy, at least in theory, on 
scientific consensus related to issues of conservation, 
mitigation, adaptation and economy—a top-down approach to 
addressing issues in the Arctic.80 Nation-states determine how 
77. L. Alessa et al., The Role of Indigenous Science and Local Knowledge in 
Integrated Observing Systems: Moving Toward Adaptive Capacity Indices and Early 
Warning Systems, SUSTAINABILITY SCI. (2015) DOI: 10.1007/s11625-015-0295-7.  
78. OSTROM, supra note 17. 
79. Elinor Ostrom, “A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Socio-
Ecological Systems,” 325 SCI. 419, 419–22 (2009). 
80. Tero Mustonen, Rebirth of Indigenous Arctic Nations and Polar Resource 
Management: Critical Perspectives from Siberia and Sámi Areas of Finland, 14(1) 
BIODIVERSITY 14, 19–27 (2013).  
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to best govern the region in accordance with international legal 
obligations and governance institutions; the ultimate voice is 
that of the eight nation-states.81 
The need for alternative governance models within the 
Arctic have begun and have been employed. Increasingly, 
innovative practices within governance are developing in the 
Arctic that work to include local and indigenous voices in 
decision-making and research.82 Skepticism toward nation-led 
governance has emerged, viewing top-down approaches as 
paternalistic and outside-imposed change as counter-
productive in the Arctic.83 This view arises from the growing 
challenges faced by Arctic communities presented by ever-
evolving desires by various nations to exploit natural 
resources, and incites discussion on developing a governance 
model based on a bottom-up system.84 Such a system would 
rely upon a polycentric approach to governance that depends 
more heavily upon informal institutions over formal ones, 
favors non-state actors over state actors, and regulates 
through soft law organizations rather than hard law.85 
As with nations’ governance decisions, Arctic communities 
are similarly not flawless in assessments of actions to be 
taken. Criticism of contemporary Arctic communities includes 
unsustainable hunting practices, overgrazing of pastures, and 
a willingness toward development of natural resources for 
economic advancement.86 A change in governance models is 
simply a call for more decision-making to include local 
observatories, to develop forums for the exchange of views and 
knowledge in a meaningful way87 and to create policy 
conditions that facilitate sustainable practices. 
Local informal institutions that contribute to governance 
come about in communities both organically and through 
81. Koivurova, Arctic Council: A Testing Ground for New International 
Environmental Governance, 19 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 131, 132 (2012). 
82. NORDEN, ARCTIC HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: REGIONAL PROCESSES AND 
GLOBAL LINKAGES 25 (Joan Nymand Larsen & Gail Fondahl eds., 2015). 
83. Csonka & Schweitzer, supra note 50, at 64. 
84. Mustonen, supra note 80, at 20. 
85. Giliberto Capano, Jeremy Rayner & Anthony R. Zito, Governance from the 
Bottom Up: Complexity and Divergence in Comparative Perspective, 90 PUB. ADMIN. 
56, 65 (2012). 
86. Mustonen, supra note 84, at 4.  
87. Id. at 3. 
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organized cooperation as issues requiring attention are 
identified. Informal governance refers to customary standards 
of conduct that allow for flexible non-codified forms of 
interaction,88 and is characterized by a lesser degree of 
institutionalization, cooperation on an ad-hoc basis, and less 
complex decision making processes and agreements.89 
Examples of informal governance in the Arctic can range from 
more organized forms, such as the Alaska Nanuuq Commission 
which is a native group representing 15 Alaska villages that 
works with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to advance the 
conservation of polar bears,90 to governance that stems from 
more cultural norms. Local communities form the roots of 
informal governance and its structure is embedded with the 
existing informal social institutions such as customs, 
traditions, rules of conduct and beliefs within a community. 
Acting as a forum for many forms of informal governance, 
the Arctic Council functions as a bridge between formal and 
some of the more organized informal forms of governance and 
is itself a soft-law institution. As mentioned previously, the 
Arctic Council goes a long way in giving indigenous peoples 
(though not necessarily actual communities) an international 
voice with the status of Permanent Participants. This allows 
representatives of indigenous groups to bring issues and 
concerns to the table in developing best practices for the 
region. The Arctic Council presents an effective method of 
bottom-up solutions that has played an increasingly important 
role in Arctic governance.91 However, within the Arctic Council 
indigenous peoples take a back seat to national actors and 
organizations because they carry no vote, nor does the Arctic 
Council have the power of enforcement, and it generally leaves 
sensitive issues such as territorial questions and fishing rights 
out of discussion.92 Despite these limitations, the Arctic 
88. Jan van Tatenhove, Jeannette Mak & Duncan Liefferink, The Inter-Play between 
Formal and Informal Practices, 7 PERSP. ON EUR. POL. & SOC'Y 8, 12–13 (2006).  
89. Colette de Roo et al., Background Paper: Environmental Governance in the 
Marine Arctic, ARCTIC TRANSFORM, 4 September 2008, at 18, available at 
http://arctic-transform.org/download/EnvGovBP.pdf. 
90. See ALASKA NANUUQ COMMISSION, http://thealaskananuuqcommission.org/. 
91. SCOTT NICHOLAS ROMANIUK, GLOBAL ARCTIC: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE FUTURE OF 
THE NORTH 69–70 (2013). 
92. MCCANNON, supra note 3, at 282.  
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Council’s full potential is yet to be discovered93 and the Arctic 
Council itself is ever-evolving to meet the needs of a fast-
changing Arctic.94 
Adding to the methods of research used increasingly by soft-
law organizations,95 information gathered by local people can 
include generational, and geographically and temporally 
specific knowledge, inclusive of the social context of 
environmental and global change.96 As a result, by including 
TLK, geographical sensitivity is narrowed, cultural sensitivity 
is heightened, and perhaps most importantly, the specific 
needs of a community are identified to help design specific 
adaptation strategies.97 
To further explore the role of CBONs in emergent informal 
social institutions, we will focus on selected villages within the 
Bering Sea region correlating with the study area of CONAS. 
This region, shared by the northeastern portion of the Russian 
Federation and the state of Alaska, is inhabited by diverse yet 
similar remote communities, which emerged from separate 
political contexts to face interrelated concerns for adapting to a 
changing environment. CONAS has partnered with eight 
indigenous communities bordering the Bering Sea in both the 
Russian Federation and Alaska, including those of the 
Siberian/St. Lawrence Island Yupik of the Bering Strait 
Region, and the Aleut/Unangax of the Aleutian Islands, both of 
which historically had extended family relations crossing over 
the present Russian-US border. A closer look at the use of 
CBONs to explore transnational trends and bring TLK to the 
forefront with potential to affect both informal governance by 
facilitating communication and the exchange of ideas, and 
national policy through bridging forums, such as the Arctic 
Council, becomes more clear. 
It is the historic political separation between the Russian 
Federation and the United States that adds a unique aspect to 
the Arctic communities separated by the Bering Sea. As 
93. ROMANIUK, supra note 91, at 70. 
94. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arctic-Council.org/index.php/en/. 
95. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International 
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 450 (2000). 
96. Jonathan Andrew Ignatowski & Jon Rosales, Identifying the Exposure of Two 
Subsistence Villages in Alaska to Climate Change Using Traditional Ecological 
Knowledge, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 285, 296 (2013).  
97. Id. at 297. 
 
                                               
20
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol5/iss1/9
2015]“WE DIDN’T CROSS THE BORDER; THE BORDER CROSSED US” 89 
described earlier, the realities of peoples existing in similar 
environmental conditions and developing like means of self-
sustaining lifestyles, were affected by the political context of 
the nation in which each community resided. When relations 
between the two nations began to normalize and 
communication and cooperation between Russian and Alaskan 
communities could formally take place, a plethora of relevant 
knowledge was discovered. 
B.  Community Observing Network for Adaptation and Security 
(CONAS) 
CBONs have the less inhibited ability to fill a multi-faceted 
role of coordinating observing for the development of shared 
adaptation strategies that nation-states are as yet unprepared 
to coordinate on. Through a regionally focused lens, they 
explore issues relating to natural resources and environmental 
security.98 These topics are addressed not as a national 
inquiry, but as local ones, impartially expanding to 
transnational concerns as necessary. The unique local 
perspectives that are attained through informal institutions, 
such as observations from CBONs, can be used immediately to 
help direct local governance, formal and informal, and also 
have potential to play a larger role in overall national and 
international policy regarding the Arctic and providing 
expanded means of adaptability. The direction of the research 
is guided by community leaders toward areas of interest and 
concern, the data are gathered by community members while 
quality control and data management occurs in partnership 
with universities and non-governmental organizations in order 
to create scientifically justifiable data products such as maps, 
and peer-reviewed reports.99 In addition, CBONs create 
98. Arctic security issues in this sense relate not to military security but focus most 
commonly on food security. Security can also include economic, cultural and, in the 
case of the Arctic, land security. All of these aspects must be sustainable in order to 
ensure a prosperous community. In the Arctic, these securities are tied to finding 
appropriate informed adaptation methods for mitigating the impact of eventual 
changes occurring in the far North. For a summary of threatened securities, see 
Gunter Weller, Summary and Synthesis of the ACIA, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 990 (2005), available at http://www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/ACIA_ 
Science_Chapters_Final/ACIA_Ch18_Final.pdf. 
99.  VICTORIA GOFMAN & MARYANN SMITH, BERING SEA SUB-NETWORK PILOT PHASE 
FINAL REPORT (2009), available at https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/ 
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opportunities for community members and leaders to have 
face-to-face discussions about issues affecting their 
communities and how they may act on new knowledge. 
The importance of thoroughly documenting information on 
the borders of transnational areas can be exemplified in recent 
efforts involving peoples on both the Russian and Alaskan 
sides of the Bering Sea. Common concerns reveal themselves, 
through monitoring of subsistence species in the Bering Sea as 
a priority concern amongst villages situated remotely on its 
shores,100 or, conversely, revealing entire areas central to 
communities’ daily lives that are not represented in the 
changing social, political and environmental climate.101 
In a recent study using data collected by CONAS, maps were 
created to compare seasonal use areas, lifetime use areas and 
“calorie-sheds” of specified communities in the Bering Sea 
ecosystem. The interest in defining these areas stems from 
concerns of potential impact of industrial activity and shipping 
routes on subsistence species, as well as effects of climate 
change. The maps were a result of combining biological data 
with data based in local systematic observations. When 
comparing the three mapping techniques produced by 
analyzing data based on different temporal scales the extent 
and nature of human use of the environment within across 
borders was resolved. From seasonal use area maps, 
awareness of the dynamic nature of subsistence patterns can 
be used to plan for and mitigate disturbances in the immediate 
future according to current seasonal conditions and can be 
used to track change over time; lifetime use areas result in a 
more comprehensive indicator of potential conflicts to be used 
in planning and regulation; the calorie-shed mapping, defined 
as where the food consumed in a community may have come 
from, extends the area of influence for each community even 
farther beyond current and historic use areas. 
Comprehensively, mapping out the full temporal range of the 
relationship between local communities and the species that 
206. 
100. Maryann Fidel et al., Walrus Harvest Locations Reflect Adaptation: A 
Contribution from a Community-Based Observation Network in the Bering Sea, 37 
POLAR GEOGRAPHY 48, 55 (2014). 
101. Susan A. Crate, Elder Knowledge and Sustainable Livelihoods in Post-Soviet 
Russia: Finding Dialogue across the Generations, 43 ARCTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 40, 49 
(2006). 
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are most important toward that community’s food security 
provides a potential opportunity for locals—decision makers 
and individuals alike—to evaluate whether and how outside 
activity in both nations might affect harvested species.102 In 
this context CBONs are able to contribute the best possible 
science based on TLK which may inform informal governance 
and may turn informal practice into a formal policy over time. 
At first glance, the scope of this study seems quite specific, 
and rightfully so. In the study cited above, the Alaskan 
communities of Gambell, Savoonga and Togiak were chosen as 
case studies because of harvest data available.103 It represents 
a small piece in the puzzle of intricate relationships that occur 
within the complex Arctic ecosystem. CBONs like CONAS fills 
a niche in understanding pan-arctic issues as its coverage area 
spans the Bering Sea representing communities on both 
Russian and Alaskan sides. Similarities between the 
communities include dependence upon a subsistence-based 
lifestyle from the Bering Sea as each community is not 
connected to a road system thereby making store-bought food 
less available and expensive.104 However, the region affecting 
these communities easily extends over national maritime 
borders presenting a clear interrelatedness between the 
transnational resources. 
C.  Shared Beringian Heritage Program 
There have been strides by both nations to improve 
cooperative efforts in substantial and innovative ways. One 
example of this is the Shared Beringian Heritage Program, 
which is a shared expanse of land envisioned as a 
transboundary protected area. Beringia, an area consisting of 
both land and sea that was once the land bridge between the 
Asian and North American continents, which includes 
102. Henry P. Huntington et al., Mapping Human Interaction with the Bering Sea 
Ecosystem: Comparing Seasonal Use Areas, Lifetime Use Areas, and "Calorie-Sheds," 
94 DEEP SEA RES. PART II: TOPICAL STUD. OCEANOGRAPHY 292 (2013). 
103. Huntington et al., supra note 102, at 294. The availability of subsistence 
harvest data developed during the Bering Sea Project directed the choice of villages 
used in the BSSN study. See also James A. Fall et al., Continuity and Change in 
Subsistence Harvests in Five Bering Sea Communities: Akutan, Emmonak, Savoonga, 
St. Paul, and Togiak, 94 DEEP SEA RES. PART II: TOPICAL STUD. OCEANOGRAPHY 274 
(2013). 
104. Fidel et al., supra note 100. 
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Northeastern Russia, Alaska and a part of Northwestern 
Canada, provides an unparalleled opportunity for study of the 
ecology, archaeology, and cultural heritage.105 While a 
transboundary protected area has yet to become full reality 
and its future is affected by fluctuating political climates, 
collaboration toward such an effort has continued since the 
mid-1980s, showing a promising cooperation amongst these 
two nations.106 
D.  Bering Strait Messenger Network 
Other forms of communication to assist adaptation have also 
occurred in the region. The Bering Strait Messenger Network 
(BSMN) is a product of the recognized need for transnational 
communication outside of national structures. Hosted by the 
Institute of the North, BSMN provides a topic of discussion 
monthly open for all interested to call in to listen or 
participate. Past topics have included, improving Arctic 
communications, food security, increased Arctic activity, 
Native language retention and many more topics of interest. 
Exemplifying the different political and economic cultures 
under which these groups have developed, and how increased 
communication can help facilitate successful adaptation the 
meeting in April 2014 was devoted to sustainable Arctic energy 
and clearly demonstrated the different environments of the 
two nations and the desire to learn from each other. While the 
State of Alaska has spent $200 million on renewable energy in 
the past six years working to develop wind, geothermal, 
hydroelectric and solar energy options to take the place of 
diesel energy, Russia has invested much less in alternative 
energy sources relying instead on individual diesel generators 
and central power plants. Interest in developing alternative 
energy sources exist, but high costs and uncertainty about 
methods inhibit exploration. However, developing geothermal 
energy is a technique gaining interest in Chukotka, especially 
with the example set in Alaska.107 On the other side, Russia 
105. See Shared Beringian Heritage Program, U.S. NAT'L PARK SERVICE, 
http://www.nps.gov/akso/beringia. 
106. Id. 
107. INSTITUTE OF THE NORTH, DRAFT MEETING MINUTES: BERING STRAIT 
MESSENGER NETWORK MONTHLY THEMATIC MEETING (April 18, 2014), available at 
https://www.institutenorth.org/assets/images/uploads/general/BSMN_April_Meeting_
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has focused development into nuclear energy and has 
expanded its nuclear energy program since 2006, looking to 
double its nuclear capacity by 2030 and reduce gas power 
energy.108 Communities in Alaska would like to learn more 
about the use of nuclear energies from their neighbors in 
Russia.109 
E.  Culture Camps 
The Urban Unangax̂ Culture Camp is another example of 
community-based cooperation amongst the peoples of the 
Bering Sea. Sponsored by the regional non-profit tribal 
organization Aleutian Pribilof Islands Association (APIA), the 
yearly Urban Culture Camp brings together youth and adults 
from the greater Aleutian Islands region to participate in 
hands-on cultural activities and promote camaraderie amongst 
the Aleut community. This resurgence of Native pride has 
increased in the past decades to rekindle cultural heritage 
suppressed during the prior period dominated by Russian and 
American influence.110 Today, fewer than a dozen Unangax 
communities remain within Alaska, which still hosts the 
majority of Unangax with some 1,700 of the roughly 3,000 
tribal members worldwide. Nikolskoye, a community on Bering 
Island in the Commander Islands of the Russian Federation, is 
home to 300 Unangax, who the Russians took to the island in 
the early 1800s.111 
All of the previously mentioned programs share increased 
communication and camaraderie across a border that has 
historically hindered relationships. Effective communication is 
essential in achieving solutions to shared challenges in 
resource use112 and can facilitate a sharing of lessons learned 
Minutes.pdf [hereinafter DRAFT MEETING MINUTES]. 
108. SUZANNE OXENSTIERNA & VELI-PEKKA TYNKKYNEN, RUSSIAN ENERGY AND 
SECURITY UP TO 2030, 150 (2014). 
109. DRAFT MEETING MINUTES, supra note 108. 
110. See APIA, http://www.apiai.org/. 
111. See History, APIA, http://www.apiai.org/culture-History/history/ (includes a 
condensed version of “Unangax: Coastal People of Far Southwestern Alaska,” a 
chapter written by Dr. Douglas Veltre to be published in Alaska’s First Peoples. Dr. 
Veltre has conducted archaeological and ethnohistorical research in the Aleutian and 
Pribilof islands since 1971.).  
112. Elinor Ostrom, Coping with Tragedies of the Commons, 2(1) ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
493 (1999). 
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while residents are actively adapting. Despite dominance by 
the powerful nation-states, the remote peoples of the Russian 
Federation and Alaska are developing their own ways to share 
information, revitalize culture, and come together in a unified 
voice to affect the kind of change they want to see. In terms of 
adaptation, with the goal of thriving in place, this kind of 
participation is paramount. 
IV.  FACILITATING EMERGENCE OF INFORMAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
Remote Arctic communities are emerging to form a collective 
set of voices that extend beyond the borders that have recently 
defined them. In the Bering Sea region, peoples of the Arctic 
share common histories linking their future securities and 
their abilities to adapt in a rapidly changing environment. 
Identifying opportunities and vulnerabilities faced by these 
communities allows for proactive, rather than reactive, 
adaptive responses and the co-production of accurate scientific 
knowledge, informed by indigenous science, that will aid policy 
makers and community leaders in developing responsible and 
equitable Arctic policies. 
In an age where forms of communication and 
complementing forums exist, remote communities have more 
opportunity than ever to take larger roles in the future 
securities of their homelands. Envisioning an Arctic without 
borders for the purpose of best meeting the needs of the Arctic 
social-ecological system amidst a changing environmental and 
geopolitical climate may not be realistic given our world 
political context, but local and soft-law entities have 
persistently taken larger roles in the pan-Arctic scene, and 
their contributions are becoming ever more numerous. The 
peoples of the Bering Sea region rely on their abilities of 
observation for their livelihoods, allowing for detailed and 
complex descriptions of local ecosystems through ingrained 
and generational knowledge.113 By incorporating this 
invaluable knowledge into other forms of information 
gathering and by understanding the means to improve 
113. Henry P. Huntington et al., Local and Traditional Knowledge Regarding the 
Bering Sea Ecosystem: Selected Results from Five Indigenous Communities, 94 DEEP 
SEA RES. PART II: TOPICAL STUD. OCEANOGRAPHY 327 (2013). 
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adaptive capacity, vulnerability analysis of this and other 
regions can offer better visions of a coordinated Arctic at both 
local and global scales.114 
A recent effort to facilitate the coordination of informal 
social institutions is the Arctic Adaptation Exchange Portal 
(AAEP), which was one of the products of the Canadian 
chairmanship of the Arctic Council. While several websites are 
dedicated to arctic issues, the AAEP aims to be accessible to 
communities “at tundra level.” More specifically, efforts are 
underway to provide datasets necessary to meaningfully 
respond to change on a day-to-day basis, as well as to provide a 
virtual exchange to share lessons learned and to better 
communicate with policy-makers. 
During the U.S. chairmanship (2015-2017), through the 
Arctic Council’s Sustainable Development Working Group, the 
AAEP will be further developed as an online space where 
communities from across the circumpolar north can meet 
online to access and share adaptation resources and 
knowledge: 
 
“Coming together is a beginning. Keeping together 
is progress, Working together is success.” – Henry 
Ford 
 
Without question, isolated Arctic communities are shaped by 
their history, influenced by their recent past, directed by 
current political structures, and changed by the changing 
landscape that dominates the activities of their lives. 
Adaptability, both of Arctic communities through the 
emergence of cooperative efforts arising from informal social 
institutions and the policies and actions of nations, will 
determine the resilience of all involved. Ideally this will chart 
a course for a future Arctic that is based on collaboration 
rather than conflict. 
 
114. James D. Ford & Tristan Pearce, Climate Change Vulnerability and Adaptation 
Research Focusing on the Inuit Subsistence Sector in Canada: Directions for Future 
Research, 56(2) CANADIAN GEOGRAPHER 275–87 (2012). 
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